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1. Introduction 
The overall size as well as the tax revenue bundle of the local public sector in multi-tiered structures of 
government are the outcomes of the decentralized decision-making process subject to the fiscal rules 
set by central (state) governments. As documented by Anderson (2006) and Wolman et al. (2008) for 
the US, and by Joumard and Kongsrud (2003) and Sutherland et al. (2005) for the OECD countries, 
top-down tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) are frequently so tight and pervasive as to jeopardize 
the very principle of local fiscal autonomy.2 
This paper aims at investigating how state-wide revenue raising limitation rules shape local 
governments’ budget constraints, focusing in particular on the kinks that are typically generated by tax 
floors and caps, and at evaluating their effects on the determination of the local tax mix and on the 
response of local public expenditures to grants. As far as the latter issue is concerned, a vast literature 
(most recently reviewed by Inman (2009)) has investigated and sought to explain the anomalously high 
response of local spending to grants relative to the response to private income - the so-called flypaper 
effect by which money from central government sticks where it hits.3 
Two broad kinds of explanations of the flypaper effect have been offered in the literature (Hines and 
Thaler, 1995). The first has to do with a variety of specification and estimation errors that applied 
researchers would have kept making for decades. Those errors range from mistakenly treating matching 
grants as if they were lump-sum to the omission of important variables - such as unobserved population 
characteristics or spatial lags of other governments’ policies - that are simultaneously correlated with 
grants and local public expenditures. The second explanation relies on the argument that the political 
representation process is substantially richer than the one postulated by the standard neoclassical 
                                                            
2According to Nechyba (1997), though, state command on local fiscal choices (in terms of income tax-funded grants and 
state-imposed caps on local property tax rates) arises in equilibrium as an optimal outside enforcement when a collusive 
agreement to simultaneously introduce local income taxes is not self-enforcing. 
3According to Inman (2009), over 3,500 research papers exist documenting and seeking to explain the flypaper effect. 
Payne (2009) offers an insightful wide-ranging review of the more recent research into the mirror phenomenon of crowd-
out. 
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model: asymmetric information, loss aversion, fiscal illusion, separate mental accounting, special 
interest groups, and citizens’ inability to write complete contracts with their elected officials would be 
responsible for the lack of fungibility between public and private uses of money, and would cause the 
observed large flypaper effect. 
This paper models for the first time the local tax mix determination process in the presence of state-
wide tax limitations - the decentralized government finance archetype - and shows how excess 
sensitivity of local public spending to grants arises in the endogenously generated constrained tax mix. 
In particular, the paper shows that the effect of private community income on public spending should 
be expected to be tiny or nil in the presence of binding limitations on all local tax revenue sources, 
while grants should be predicted to have a large - actually, a one-for-one - impact on local 
expenditures. Interestingly, a binding cap on just one of the available own revenue sources is enough to 
generate some form of flypaper effect, in the sense of an excess sensitivity of local spending to grants, 
and the above result holds when either upper or lower tax limitations are in place. Finally, since excess 
sensitivity of local public spending should be predicted to arise and generally tends to manifest itself 
both when grants increase and when they decrease, the flypaper effect label seems an inappropriate or 
even misleading one. In fact, excess sensitivity of local public expenditures to grants cannot in general 
be interpreted as a sinister symptom of overspending. 
While the existing literature seems to have almost universally overlooked the potential impact of tax 
and expenditure limitation systems on the sensitivity of local public spending to exogenous variations 
in grants, two recent papers have brought the fiscal limitations issue into the investigation of the 
flypaper effect. Lutz (2010) conjectures that previous evidence of a flypaper effect might have arisen 
from state constraints preventing local governments from selecting their preferred bundle of public 
goods, and provides evidence of equivalence between grants and income from a school finance reform 
in New Hampshire – “one of only five states with no state-imposed limitations on the taxing or 
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spending power of local governments” (Lutz, 2010, p. 317). Brooks and Phillips (2010) represent the 
first formal statement and empirical test of the hypothesis that restrictive fiscal institutions might be 
responsible for the flypaper effect. They use data on the US Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) program and argue that state TELs may systematically force city governments to 
underprovide local public goods and therefore increase the stimulative effect of federal grants on city 
spending. However, since they do not observe either the municipal tax bundle or whether a revenue 
raising constraint is binding in any given city, they have to rely on a state-level index of fiscal 
constraints and ignore altogether both the municipal choice as to own revenue source diversification 
and the issue of endogenous selection of a city government into the fiscally constrained status.4 
This paper concludes with an application to Italian provincial governments’ panel data. An attractive 
feature of Italian Provinces is that their own tax revenue sources (a tax on vehicle registrations, a tax on 
electricity consumption for business uses, and a waste management surcharge) are subject to strict and 
frequently binding upper as well as lower tax rate limitations. The empirical analysis exploits the 
clustering of provincial authorities at the corners produced by those tax limitation rules, and estimates 
the effect of grants on local expenditures for two groups of authorities - those severely affected by tax 
limits and those that are only mildly affected, - showing that the former authorities exhibit a sensitivity 
of spending that is significantly higher than the latter. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a model for the analysis of the local tax mix in the 
presence of right and left constrained tax instruments. Sections 3 develops the model’s empirical 
implications and outlines the econometric strategy and section 4 tackles the issue of endogenous 
selection. Finally, section 5 reports and discusses the estimation results on the Italian Provinces’ panel 
data, and section 6 concludes. 
                                                            
4Interestingly, Brooks and Phillips (2010) find excess sensitivity of spending to grants in a period of dramatic 
retrenchement, while they comprehensibly find limited evidence of an effect of overall state-level tax limitations on 
municipal governments’ response to the collapse in CDBG grants. 
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 2. Communicating vessels 
Consider the two vessels in figure 1. Say that vessel vpn represents consumption of private goods out of 
community n private income in (n=1,…,N) and vessel vgn represents consumption of local public 
services. The structure depicted in (1.a) amounts to a perfect tax centralization arrangement, where 
expenditures on local public services are entirely funded by central government grants gn, and nothing 
ensures that the allocation of resources to private and public uses reflects the preferences of the local 
community or that the marginal benefit from private consumption equals the marginal benefit from 
public consumption. 
In the central picture (1.b), the two vessels are allowed to communicate via local tax revenues. In order 
for the local public goods to be provided optimally, and given that the marginal rate of transformation 
between private and public goods is constant and equal to one, the marginal utility in the two vessels 
has to be equalized. Just like communicating vessels, where the force of gravity requires hydrostatic 
pressure to be balanced out in the two vessels regardless of their relative sizes, the welfare optimization 
forces make resources flow from vpn to vgn at the tax rate 
n
n
i
t
n =τ . Once the equilibrium level is attained 
in the two vessels, whether additional resources are poured into vpn or into vgn, the same allocation of 
private and public consumption will result by the law of communicating vessels. 
In the lower picture (1.c), local jurisdiction n is subject to a tax rate cap equal to 
n
hn
i
th = , with the cap 
binding if  thn < tn. The Samuelson condition for optimal public good provision will not be satisfied if 
the tax cap is binding, meaning that more resources ought to flow from vpn to vgn in order to equate the 
pressure in the two vessels. An additional unit of private income will raise the consumption level at rate 
1 – h in vpn, and at the rate h in vgn. If additional grants are poured into (pumped out of) vgn, the level 
will rise (fall) in vgn only. The flypaper effect, so to say. 
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Figure 1 Communicating vessels 
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2.1 The one-tax case 
According to the standard local public finance framework that is conventionally employed to analyze 
the decentralized tax-expenditure decision process (Inman, 2009), the welfare of jurisdiction n 
(n=1,…,N) can be expressed as a quasi-concave function exhibiting decreasing marginal benefits from 
local public expenditures as well as increasing marginal cost of raising own revenues: 
);();( nnnnnn ibCzVW τ−= x           (1) 
In general terms, zn equals local public spending, local tax revenues are raised by setting a flat tax rate 
τn on a local tax base bn, xn is a vector of community characteristics reflecting preferences for local 
public services, and in represents some meaningful measure of community income. Assume further that 
local authorities abide to a balanced budget rule: 
nnnn bgz τ+=             (2) 
where gn equals lump-sum grants from central government.5 Maximization of (1) subject to (2) leads 
jurisdiction n to select the optimal tax rate-spending pair ( )∗∗ nn z,τ  as a function of the assumed 
exogenous variables gn, in, and bn.6 An exogenous increase (decrease) in grants would provoke an 
increase (decrease) in spending by a certain proportion of the grant itself, depending on the shape of the 
welfare function. Actually, a change in in by the same amount as the change in gn should have an 
identical effect on zn: when this does not happen, and in particular if a change in grants turns out in 
practice to provoke a much larger reaction in spending than a change in income does, a flypaper effect 
is said to exist (Hines and Thaler, 1995). 
Consider now the introduction of a tax rate cap such that nn h≤τ , and assume that nn h>∗τ , meaning 
that local government n is at a corner solution. The constrained optimization problem is depicted in 
                                                            
5It is usually convenient to interpret all monetary variables in (2) as measured in per capita terms, thus implying that 
publicly provided services entering the welfare function (1) are private (rival) in nature. 
6Tax base endogeneity is allowed for in the next section. 
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figure 2.7 
Figure 2 One tax: income change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the absence of the cap and with grant gn and income in, authority n is at point 0. After capping, the 
constrained tax rate-spending pair is ( )nnnn bhgh +,  at point 1. For given grants, an increase in in to in# 
moves government n to point 2, with a zero impact on public spending (or little impact if in and bn are 
positively correlated). On the other hand, figure 3 shows that, given the right censoring in local tax 
revenues, an increase in grants from gn to gn# leads to a one-for-one increase in zn (point 3). In the 
above circumstances, the flypaper effect is the result of capping. In fact, since excess sensitivity of 
local public spending should be predicted to arise (as figure 3 suggests) and generally tends to manifest 
                                                            
7The basic idea underlying figures 2 and 3 first appeared in Brooks and Phillips (2010). 
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itself both when grants increase and when they decrease (Stine, 1994; Hines and Thaler, 1995; 
Gamkhar and Oates, 1996), the flypaper effect label seems an inappropriate or even misleading one.8 
 
Figure 3 One tax: grant change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 The multiple-tax case 
Consider now the case of government n relying on M≥2 own tax revenues. Dropping the n subscript to 
save on notation, and denoting by τm the rate set on tax base m (bm), the budget constraint is: 
                                                            
8Interestingly, the fiscal limitation approach can also explain the somewhat sparse evidence of excess smoothness of local 
public spending in response to grant cuts - what is improperly termed the asymmetric flypaper effect (in fact, the flypaper 
effect metaphor seems to be asymmetric by definition). In the presence of centrally mandated services, local public 
spending should be expected to exhibit little or no sensitivity to grants (excess smoothness) in periods of retrenchment. 
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mm
M
m
bggz τ∑
=
′ +=+=
1
bτ           (3) 
Allowing for heterogeneous marginal costs of raising revenues from the potentially endogenous M tax 
sources (Hettich and Winer, 1988), the welfare function can be expressed as: 
);,...,();();( 11 ibbCgVW MMττ−+= ′ xbq ττ         (4) 
where: [ ]′′ = xq ig . Letting mmmm bbm ττε ∂∂≡  be the own tax rate elasticity of tax base m, the first order 
conditions for maximization of (4) require equalization of the marginal contribution to welfare of 
spending an additional unit of own tax revenue on local public services ( )
)1(
1);( mmm b
Vgv ετ +∂
∂′ =+ xbτ  to 
the marginal costs of raising revenues across all tax bases ( )Mmc mmm bCm ,...,1 ,)1( 1 == +∂∂ ετ , resulting in a 
vector of optimal tax rates and expenditure level: 
[ ])(...)()( 1 qqq ∗∗∗ =′ Mτττ           (5) 
)()()(
1
qqq mm
M
m
bgz ∗
=
∗ ∑+= τ           (6) 
Figure 4 shows a graphical representation of the optimal tax mix determination problem under the 
simplifying assumption that the marginal cost of raising revenues from tax m is independent of τj for 
j≠m (Hettich and Winer, 1984). We assume here that M=2, and let the marginal cost and benefit 
functions be linear for graphical convenience. Given grants g, the optimal tax rates and spending vector 
is [ ]∗∗∗ z21 ττ . Similarly to the one-tax case, an exogenous increase in grants, say from g to g#, is 
expected to bring about an increase in spending as well as a decrease in reliance on both own tax 
sources [ ]##2#1 zττ , with the direction and intensity of the tax mix adjustment depending on the slope 
of the marginal cost functions.9
                                                            
9When grants go from g to g#, the v function shifts left by (g#-g). It is easy to show that an identical increase in community’s 
private income shifts the marginal cost function c to the right by (g#-g), and should therefore be expected to have the same 
impact on local public spending as the grant increase. 
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Figure 4 Two taxes: no tax limitations 
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Consider now the consequences of central government imposing the following tax rate limitations 
(m=1,…,M): 
mmm hl ≤≤≤ τ0            (7) 
Given the welfare function (4) and the constraints (7), and letting [ ] 0...... 11 ≥=′ lMlhMh λλλλλ  be the 
vector of Lagrange multipliers, we can write the Lagrangian function as: 
)()();(),(
11
mmlm
M
m
mmhm
M
m
lhWL τλτλ +−+−+= ∑∑
==
qτλτ       (8) 
The necessary Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the tax rate vector to be an optimum are:10 
0),(0),(0),( =∇≥∇=∇ λτλλτλτ λλτ LLL        (9) 
or, for m=1,…,M: 
0);(),( =+−∂
∂=∂
∂ lmhm
mm
WL λλττ
qτλτ          (10) 
0)(0),( =−≥−=∂
∂ mmhmmm
hm hh
L τλτλ
λτ         (11) 
0)(0),( =+−≥+−=∂
∂ mmlmmm
lm ll
L τλτλ
λτ        (12) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (10)-(11)-(12) show that when τm = hm, the gradient of the welfare 
function is positive ( )hmW m λτ =∂∂ );( qτ , meaning that the unconstrained optimal tax rate lies to the right of 
hm. Similarly, if τm = lm the gradient of the welfare function is negative ( )lmW m λτ −=∂∂ );( qτ , so that the 
unconstrained optimal tax rate lies to the left of lm. 
Figures 5 and 6 offer a graphical representation of the constrained optimization process and illustrate 
how corner solutions arise.11 
                                                            
10Provided that (4) is concave, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are sufficient. 
11Interestingly, all of the tax mix corners depicted in figures 5 and 6 turn out to be relevant in the empirical application in 
section 5. 
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Figure 5 Two taxes: left and right constrained tax mix outcomes 
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Figure 6 Two taxes: other constrained tax mix outcomes 
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In particular, figure 5 focuses on the following two cases: 
• Constrained tax mix RR: both tax rates are right-constrained, meaning that an authority’s optimal 
tax rates lie to the right of the upper limits. 
• Constrained tax mix LL: both tax rates are left-constrained. 
On the other hand, figure 6 illustrates the following three cases: 
• Constrained tax mix UR: one of the tax rates is unconstrained and the other is right-constrained. 
• Constrained tax mix LU: one of the tax rates is left-constrained and the other is unconstrained. 
• Constrained tax mix LR: one of the tax rates is left-constrained and the other is right-constrained. 
Let us ask again what effect an exogenous change in grants would have on local public spending. When 
both revenue sources are constrained - cases RR and LL in figure 5, and LR in figure 6 - any change in 
grants necessarily translates into an identical change in spending levels, with no variation in τ1 and τ2. 
Local public expenditure displays an excess sensitivity to grants. 
When only one of the two fiscal instruments is at a corner - cases UR and LU in figure 6 - the change 
in spending will typically be smaller than the change in grants. However, the binding constraint on one 
of the available tax revenues makes the total marginal cost of raising revenues steeper than it would be 
in the absence of constraints. Since local authorities can rely on fewer tax instruments, the cost of 
raising revenues is more sensitive to changes in the budget requirement: as a result of the increase in 
grants, the impact on public expenditures is larger than would occur if both tax rates could freely 
adjust. Of course, excess sensitivity of spending will be observed both when grants increase and when 
they decrease. 
The above results can be summarized as follows. 
• In a fully constrained tax mix, local public spending exhibits little or no sensitivity to private 
income changes; on the other hand, local public expenditures respond to changes in grants on a 
one-for-one basis. 
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• As long as changes in exogenous sources of revenue do not provoke a segment jump, upper-
constrained authorities ),( mhmm ∀=τ , lower-constrained authorities ),( ml mm ∀=τ , and lower and 
upper-constrained authorities ),...,1,;,...,1,( Mmmhmml mmmm +==== ττ  exhibit the same 
sensitivity of public spending to grants. 
• In a partially constrained tax mix: a) the total marginal cost of raising revenues is flatter and the 
sensitivity of local public spending to grants is smaller than it is in a fully constrained tax mix; b) 
the total marginal cost of raising revenues is steeper and the sensitivity of local public spending to 
grants is larger than it is in the absence of binding tax limitations. 
 
3. Empirical implications and econometric approach 
The theoretical model sketched in section 2 above prompts the estimation of the sensitivity of local 
public expenditures to changes in exogenous revenue sources, while allowing for heterogeneous 
responses depending on the degree to which local governments face financing constraints. In fact, the 
empirical investigation of the excess sensitivity of local government spending to grants bears a striking 
similarity with two well developed lines of research. 
The first concerns the inquiry into the role of financing and liquidity constraints in explaining the 
elasticity of investment to cash-flow in Q models of the firm (Bond and Meghir, 1994; Fazzari et al., 
1988, Hu and Schiantarelli, 1998, Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, Cummins et al., 2006).12 The second 
relates to the borrowing constraint interpretation of the excess sensitivity of private consumption to 
disposable income in permanent income/life cycle frameworks (Runkle, 1989, Zeldes, 1991, Jappelli et 
al., 1998).13 
                                                            
12In their flypaper effect review, Hines and Thaler (1995) mentioned the liquidity constraint explanation of flypaper-like 
effects in the private sector. However, they did not consider the possibility that local tax and expenditure limitations might 
be the root cause of the flypaper effect. 
13Borge and Tovmo (2009) test whether liquidity constraints imposed by balanced-budget rules affect the intertemporal 
spending behavior of Norwegian local governments, and find that departures from rational forward-looking public 
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In the empirical investment and consumption literatures, the conventional approach consists in splitting 
the sample according to an a priori index of financing/liquidity constraint (typically related to the 
dividend payout or liquid assets to capital stock ratio for firms, and to the asset-income ratio for 
consumers), and compare the switching regression estimates of the sensitivity of investment 
(consumption) to cash flow (income) for the constrained and unconstrained subsamples (Fazzari et al., 
1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, and Runkle, 1989). 
Similarly, in order to test on panel data whether the local public spending response to changes in 
exogenous sources of revenue is affected by the tax limitation regime a local government is subject to, 
a time-invariant selection criterion can be employed and authorities assigned to either of two 
subsamples based on whether they are consistently constrained (or not constrained) during the whole 
period of observation (t=1,…,T): 
1if111 =++= ′ nntnntnt Kz ηζβq          (13) 
0if000 =++= ′ nntnntnt Kz ηζβq          (14) 
where: [ ]′′ = ntntntnt ig xq , [ ]′′ = 1111 xig ββ ββ , [ ]′′ = 0000 xig ββ ββ , and 1nζ  and 0nζ  are fixed jurisdiction 
effects that might be correlated with qnt. The switching indicator Kn is defined as: 
{ }{ }⎩⎨
⎧
∀∈∃/
∀∈=
mhlt
tmhl
K mmm
nt
mmm
nt
n ,,:
,,,
if
0
1
τ
τ
         (15) 
According to the sample separation criterion (15), parameter 0gβ  in equation (14) captures the response 
of spending to grants by authorities that are not structurally constrained (i.e., authorities that never have 
all constraints binding in any of the T observation years), while parameter 1gβ  in equation (13) 
measures the response by authorities that are structurally capped, in the sense that tax limitations are 
binding for all revenue sources and in all years. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
consumption smoothing can in part be explained by financing constraints. 
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One potential problem with the above approach is sample selection bias, in the sense that the splitting 
variable Kn might be correlated with spending znt. However, since selection effects can only occur 
through correlation between Kn and the time-invariant authority-specific effects 1nζ  and 0nζ , any 
selection bias is cancelled by differencing them away in equations (13)-(14). Consequently, a linear 
panel data fixed effects estimator can be applied to the two subsamples (Charlier et al., 2001). 
A disadvantage of the separation rule (15), though, consists in the fact that it implies freezing the 
sample and renouncing to using information on governments that switch from one regime to the other 
over the period of observation (Hu and Schiantarelli, 1998). 
An alternative empirical approach - based, among the others, on Bond and Meghir (1994), Jappelli et 
al. (1998), Zeldes (1989) and Cummins et al. (2006) - consists in allowing for a time-varying constraint 
status as in (16) below: 
{ }{ }⎩⎨
⎧
∉∃
∀∈= mmm
nt
mmm
nt
nt hlm
mhl
K
,:
,,
if
0
1
τ
τ
         (16) 
giving rise to the switching regression model: 
1if111 =++= ′ ntntnntnt Kz ηζβq          (17) 
0if000 =++= ′ ntntnntnt Kz ηζβq          (18) 
Clearly, though, whether an authority is at a tax mix corner solution might in principle be determined 
endogenously. This would occur in the presence of unobserved shocks to expenditures pushing local 
authorities towards the corners. 
Given the sample separation rule (16), the endogenous selection problem is somewhat mitigated here 
by the fact that the constrained regime for which Knt=1 includes high spenders hitting the upper tax 
bounds (constrained tax mix RR), low spenders hitting the lower tax bounds (constrained tax mix LL) 
and authorities hitting lower and upper bounds on different tax rates at the same time (constrained tax 
mix LR). As a result, it is unclear a priori whether and how would Knt be correlated with unobservable 
18
shocks to znt. However, the endogenous selection issue is developed further in the next section. 
 
4. Endogenous selection 
In order to explore the endogenous selection issue in greater depth, the selection process (16) needs to 
be given an explicit stochastic structure. We do so by following the Wooldridge (1995) two-stage 
procedure for fixed effects panel data, with a selection equation being consistently estimated in the first 
stage, and the main spending equation being estimated in the second stage after correcting for selection 
bias.14 The Wooldridge (1995) approach relies on estimation in levels, and has the great advantage 
relative to econometric approaches based on pairwise differencing on units for which Knt=Kns=1, t≠s  
(Kyriazidou, 1997) of not requiring any exclusion restrictions in the main equation. In fact, since the 
constrained optimization model in section 2 predicts the level of spending znt and the capping regime 
Knt to be determined simultaneously as a function of the vector of exogenous variables qnt, exclusion 
restrictions in the znt equation would be logically inconsistent.15 
Let us focus on selection into the fully constrained regime Knt=1. A sufficient condition for the fixed 
effects estimator of equation (17) on the unbalanced panel to be consistent is that the selection process 
be strictly exogenous conditional on 1nζ  and qn: 
0),...,,,...,,(),,( 11
1111 == nTnnTnnntnnnnt KKEE qqKq ζηζη       (19) 
As clearly shown by equation (16), Knt depends in a structural way on M distinct tax rate realizations, 
where the process underlying the determination of each tax rate  mntτ   (m=1,…,M) can be expressed in a 
latent variable form as: 
                                                            
14Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007) give a simple illustration and an application of the Wooldridge (1995) and 
related procedures. 
15In addition, the Kyriazidou (1997) pairwise differencing estimator has the data-shrinking shortcoming of using only those 
observations for which the linear index in the selection equation is approximately equal in periods t and s (see equation (24) 
below). 
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ntτ  in (20) is the partially unobserved optimal tax rate of authority n in year t, whose non-stochastic 
component descends directly from the model sketched in section 2: 
m
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m
nt a++= ′∗ ξτ γq           (21) 
where: [ ]′′ = mxmimgm γγ γγ , and mnξ  is an authority and revenue-source specific effect that might be 
correlated with qnt. In fact, correlation between fixed effect and regressors in (21) can be 
accommodated by assuming - as in Mundlak (1978) - a linear relationship between mnξ  and the time 
averages of qnt: 
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where: mn
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n j+= ′ θqξ , ntTtTn qq ∑= =11 , and )( mntmnmnt aju +≡  is normally distributed and is independent 
of nq . 
For Knt=1, let  m   be the number of binding lower constraints and mM −  the number of binding upper 
constraints, with Mm ≤≤0 . According to (16), (20) and (22), and letting  ( )ntM uφ   be the multivariate 
distribution of the vector of error terms from the M tax rate equations, the probability that authority n is 
fully constrained can be expressed as: 
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Estimation of (23) is complicated by the need to evaluate an  M-dimensional integral.16 For reasons of 
tractability, we therefore focus on the reduced form of the observed selection outcome Knt: 
[ ]01 >++== ′∗ ntnntntnt KK εμδq          (24) 
meaning that Knt=1 if 0>∗ntK , where ∗ntK  is a latent variable and μn is a time-invariant authority-
specific effect that can be allowed to be correlated with the explanatory variables in a linear way: 
[ ]01 >++== ′′∗ ntnntntnt vKK αδ qq          (25) 
with: nnn κμ += ′ αq , ntTtTn qq ∑= =11 , and )( ntnntv εκ +≡  is normally distributed and is independent of  
nq .
17 
Wooldridge (1995) suggests the following procedure. Assume: 
nttntntntnTnntntnnt vvEvEvE ηρηηη === )(),,...,(),( 1111 qqq       (26) 
nttnntnTnnntnn vvEvE ζρζζ +ψ′== qqqq ),,...,(),( 111        (27) 
According to (26), 1ntη  is mean independent of qn conditional on vnt, and its expectation is linear in vnt, 
while (27) is a linearity assumption on the conditional expectation of the fixed effect 1nζ . No 
distributional assumptions are imposed on 1ntη  and 1nζ . Consequently, upon defining ttt ζη ρρρ +≡ , and 
given that vnt is not observed, but the selection index Knt is, equation (17) can be written as: 
[ ]1,)1,( 1 =++== ′′ ntnnttnntntnnt KvEKzE qqqq ρψβ        (28) 
The procedure consists in estimating (25) by Probit, obtaining the inverse Mills ratio (λnt), and 
replacing it in (28): 
                                                            
16See Heien and Wessells (1990), Shonkwiler and Yen (1999), Golan et al. (2001), and Yen and Lin (2006). 
17In performing the Wooldridge (1995) procedure, the Mundlak (1978) correction seems preferable in this context to the 
alternative Chamberlain (1982) approach. The latter consists in expressing fixed effects as a linear combination of the 
explanatory variables from all time periods: TnTtntn ααα ′′′ +++ qqq ......11 . Assuming instead, in the Mundlak (1978) 
spirit, that the fixed effect depends only on the time average of ntq  greatly conserves on parameters, at the cost of imposing 
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ntnttnntnt oz +++= ′′ λρψβ qq 1           (29) 
Wooldridge (1995) proves that pooled OLS on (29) leads to consistent estimates of the parameter 
vector of interest 1β . 
 
5. Empirical implementation 
5.1 Local tax limitations in Italy 
The impact of tax limitations on the sensitivity of local public spending to grants is tested on panel data 
for the Italian Provinces through the years 2000 to 2007. The Italian system of local government is 
organized as a three-tier structure, with the 103 Provinces constituting the intermediate level of 
government between the regional (20 Regions) and the municipal (over 8,000 Municipalities) ones. 
Provinces have responsibility for intermunicipal road construction and maintenance, local 
transportation systems, secondary education schools, waste management and environmental protection. 
Provincial expenditures rose considerably in recent years, mostly due to the devolution of functions 
from the national and regional governments. In fact, average per capita spending increased by about 
25% in real terms between 2000 and 2007. 
Over 3/4 of total current provincial spending is funded by grants from upper levels of government 
(State and Regions), with the proportion of grant-funded expenditures remaining roughly constant 
through the 2000-2007 period. State grants are for the most part general and formula-based. They rely 
on the definition of a standardized spending level for each Province built on exogenous needs 
indicators falling into three broad areas (age structure of the resident population; geomorphological 
complexion; socioeconomic deprivation), as well as of a fiscal capacity index capturing the ability of 
each Province to raise own and shared revenues.18 In particular, Provinces are divided into four 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
the parameter restriction: αααα TTt 1===== ......1  in equation (25). 
18Shared revenues crowd-out grants one-for-one, and are therefore subsumed into the latter. 
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demographic bands, and average service cost indices for a number of mandated provincial functions 
and average tax bases are periodically computed (usually every three years) for each band. 
Expenditures on non-mandated provincial services do not enter the grant distribution scheme and must 
be entirely funded by own revenues. On the other hand, regional grants typically finance specific 
functions that were devolved to Provinces during the decentralization process of the late 1990s. 
As a result of the above institutional arrangement, State and regional grants can to a large extent be 
considered exogenous with respect to own funding decisions by provincial governments. In particular, 
given the infrequent central assessment of spending needs and fiscal capacity, changes in provincial 
socioeconomic conditions are not promptly reflected into State grant adjustments.19 Moreover, the fact 
that State grants are based on a Province’s needs and fiscal capacity indices relative to its demographic 
band mean should alleviate the potential problem of grant endogeneity arising from shocks moving 
grants and local expenditures in the same direction.20 
The rest of current spending is funded by three own tax revenue sources: the vehicle registration tax, 
the electricity consumption tax, and the waste management tax. The vehicle registration tax represents 
over 50% of total own tax revenues. All brand new vehicles - as well as used vehicles in case of change 
of ownership - are liable to the payment of the tax the first time they are registered in the provincial 
archive under a given owner’s name. The total tax due is made of a lump-sum amount plus a variable 
component that is related to the size, power and destination of the vehicle. As shown in table 1, central 
government establishes a lower and an upper bound on the vehicle tax parameters that Provinces can 
set, with the upper bound corresponding to a 20% higher tax burden (raised to 30% in 2007) than the 
one corresponding to the lower bound. Consequently, the decision of each Province basically consists 
                                                            
19Gordon (2004) exploits the infrequent updating of poverty data used in the US federal education grants to school districts 
(Title I). However, since Title I grants also depend on state education spending, she computes a purely Census-determined 
grant change measure and uses it as an instrument for actual Title I revenue change - a step that seems unnecessary in our 
simpler context. 
20A similar point is made in Brooks and Phillips (2010). 
23
in determining autonomously the surcharge τv. 
The electricity consumption tax is applied by Provinces on business uses of electricity. As shown in 
table 1, Provinces set a tax rate τe between a minimum of 9.3 and a maximum of 11.4 Euro cents per 
kW. Electricity tax revenues correspond to above 1/3 of total own tax revenues. Finally, the waste 
management tax is a surcharge applied by Provinces on the waste collection bill charged by the 
municipalities located in the province on all households and businesses. Table 1 shows that the 
surcharge τw must lie between 1% and 5% of the municipal levy. Revenues from the waste 
management tax amount to about 10% of total provincial own tax revenues. 
 
Table 1 Lower and upper tax limitation rules 
  2000-6 2007 
Vehicle registration tax  ?v    lv   0 0 
(% surcharge on national rate)  hv   20 30 
Electricity consumption tax  ?e    le   9.3 9.3 
(Euro cents per kW)  he   11.4 11.4 
Waste management tax  ?w    lw   1 1 
(% surcharge on municipal levy)  hw   5 5 
 
Table 2 reports the number of authorities setting tax rates at the lower and upper limits respectively, 
while table 3 rates the authority-year observations based on how severely they are affected by the tax 
rate limitations.21 More than half of the observations in the dataset (416 out of 720) correspond to fully 
bound instances, with all available tax sources being set at left or right corners, while in only 9 
observations none of the constraints is binding. For about 40% of the observations either one or two tax 
limitations are binding, and in over 1/3 of the observed tax mix outcomes a lower and an upper limit 
are simultaneously binding. 
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Table 2 Number of authorities (N=90) at lower and upper limits 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 vτ   vl  25 15 9 7 7 5 4 3 
 vh  55 65 71 72 73 77 79 43 
 eτ   el  66 54 43 37 34 27 18 15 
 eh  16 29 39 45 47 52 59 64 
 wτ   wl  3 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 
 wh  66 64 66 65 65 66 66 68 
 
Table 3 Tax limitation intensity 
 Fully constrained total 
 (h,h,h) (h,h,l) (h,l,l) (l,l,l)      
 vτ   vh  vh  vh  vl  vh  vl  vl  vl       
 eτ   eh  eh  el  eh  el  eh  el  el       
 wτ   wh  wl  wh  wh  wl  wl  wh  wl       
obs. 238 6 130 0 3 0 28 11     416 
 Moderately constrained  
 (h,h) (h,l) (l,l)  
 vτ   vh  vh  ∗vτ  vh  vl  vh  vl  ∗vτ  ∗vτ  vl  vl  ∗vτ   
 eτ   eh  ∗eτ  eh  el  eh  ∗eτ  ∗eτ  eh  el  el  ∗eτ  el   
 wτ   ∗wτ  wh  wh  ∗wτ  ∗wτ  wl  wh  wl  wh  ∗wτ  wl  wl   
obs. 61 60 27 36 3 0 0 1 39 32 0 0  
 (h) (l)        
 vτ   vh  ∗vτ  ∗vτ  vl  ∗vτ  ∗vτ         
 eτ   ∗eτ  eh  ∗eτ  ∗eτ  el  ∗eτ         
 wτ   ∗wτ  ∗wτ  wh  ∗wτ  ∗wτ  wl         
obs. 1 15 4 1 15 0       295 
 Not constrained  
 vτ   ∗vτ              
 eτ   ∗eτ              
 wτ   ∗wτ              
obs. 9            9 
             720 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
21The data refer to the 90 Provinces (out of 103) for which all information from 2000 to 2007 is available. 
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5.2 Time-invariant splitting indicator 
The sample is first split based on a time-invariant indicator Kn that equals 1 if Province m is constrained 
on all own tax revenue sources for the entire period of observation, and equals 0 if the authority never 
has all constraints binding. This accords with the splitting criterion (15). By doing so, we rule out the 
effect of yearly changes in grants on the capping status, and focus on the difference in the response of 
local public expenditures to grant changes. Moreover, since selection effects occur through correlation 
between Kn and the time-invariant authority-specific effects 1nζ  and 0nζ  in (13)-(14), any selection bias 
is cancelled by applying a fixed effects estimator on the two subsamples. 
Application of the splitting criterion (15) yields Kn=1 for 24 provincial authorities, and Kn=0 for 20 
authorities in the 2001-2006 period, the rest of the observations being discarded (to be used later on) 
because of changing regime during the period. This leaves us with 264 observations.22 Of the 24 
structurally capped authorities, 17 were at the upper bounds on all three own tax rates for the entire 
period, 5 were hitting two upper bounds and one lower bound, one Province was at one upper and two 
lower bounds, and one Province was consistently at the three lower bounds. On the other hand, the 
authorities in the Kn=0 regime have one to two constraints binding. 
We first estimate the switching regression model (13)-(14)-(15) as a single equation, with Kn working 
as a switcher, thus allowing us to test the difference between the 0β  and 1β  coefficient vectors: 
))()(()( 001100010 ntnntnntntnntnntnt KKz ηζηζηζ +−+×+++−×+= ′′ βββ qq     (30) 
where znt equals current spending per capita in real terms, and the vector of explanatory variables 
[ ]′′ = ntntntnt ig xq  includes: 
gnt: per capita grants = all current financial transfers from upper levels of government (State and 
Regions), including the fixed shares of national tax revenues devolved to Provinces (national personal 
                                                            
22In order to preserve the size of the Kn=1 sample, it seems sensible to exclude the last year in the sample because of the 
vehicle tax cap relaxation that occurred in 2007 (from 20% to 30%). Similarly, the first year (2000) is excluded since 
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income tax and national motor-vehicle insurance tax); 
int: per capita consumption of electricity for domestic uses as a proxy for private income; 
xnt: population size to control for economies of scale in service provision; demographic composition of 
the resident population (share of the population aged 0 to 4 years and aged over 65 years); a binary 
election year indicator to allow for opportunistic policy manoeuvring prior to elections;23 a binary 
government ideology indicator to capture a partisan cleavage in spending policy between right-wing 
and left-wing governments.24 
The fixed effects estimation results of equation (30) are reported in table 4, while table 5 reports the 
separate estimation results of equations (13) and (14) for the two subsamples. All equations include 
year dummies. Descriptive statistics and data sources for all variables are reported in the Appendix. 
Interestingly, all authorities exhibit what would be termed a flypaper effect according to conventional 
criteria in the literature. The results in table 4 show that the grant effect is large and highly significant, 
while the coefficient on the income proxy is hardly different from zero. In fact, the Kn=0 subsample is 
far from being unconstrained in practice, given that those authorities are capped on one or two tax rates 
along the period. However, structurally capped authorities’ expenditures react to grants to a 
significantly larger extent, actually on a one-for-one basis. The estimate of the effect of grants on 
spending is around 0.7 for the moderately constrained subsample (columns (4.2), (4.4) and (4.6) in 
table 4; columns (5.2), (5.4) and (5.6) in table 5), while the coefficient estimate virtually equals 1 for 
structurally bound Provinces (columns (5.1), (5.3) and (5.5) in table 5).25 
The results are robust to the introduction of various controls, none of which, though, due to their 
comprehensibly limited variation over the relatively short time period and the overwhelming role of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
several Provinces became consistently capped from the year 2001 on. 
23Provincial elections take place every five years with direct election of the President of the Province. The provincial 
election schedule is asymmetric, meaning that Provinces hold elections at different points in time. 
24In particular, we use a right-wing control dummy. In most instances, the President of the Province is backed by a well-
defined right-wing or left-wing coalition. 
25When estimating a constant elasticity specification (results not reported in full, but available upon request), the grant and 
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grants, contributes much to further explaining the pattern of spending. 
 
Table 4 Time-invariant splitting criterion (Kn) 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) 
grants 0.844** 
(0.035) 
0.722** 
(0.046) 
0.840** 
(0.034) 
0.716** 
(0.046) 
0.842** 
(0.035) 
0.731** 
(0.049) 
income   0.040* 
(0.021)  
0.055* 
(0.025)  
0.033 
(0.023)  
0.042 
(0.030)  
population     -0.091 
(0.081)  
-0.142 
(0.124)  
age 0-4 share     -2.147 
(5.896)  
-5.750 
(7.569)  
age 65+ share     -3.789 
(3.340)  
-6.076 
(5.217)  
election     0.300 
(1.356)  
-0.315 
(1.784)  
right-wing     2.176 
(2.881)  
6.767 
(6.662)  
 Kn × grants  0.253** 
(0.069)  
 0.258** 
(0.069)  
 0.259** 
(0.073)  
 Kn × income    -0.047 
(0.045)  
 -0.027 
(0.050)  
 Kn × population      0.094 
(0.163)  
 Kn × age 0-4 share      15.520 
(12.217) 
 Kn × age 65+ share      10.066 
(7.047)  
 Kn × election      0.898 
(2.718)  
 Kn × right-wing      -5.677 
(7.393)  
Observations 264 264 264 264 264 264 
Authorities 44 44 44 44 44 44 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: real current spending per capita. Fixed Province and year effects included; year effects 
interacted with the switching indicator Kn in columns (4.2), (4.4) and (4.6). Kn defined in equation (15). Standard errors in 
parentheses. **: p-value < 0.01; *: p-value < 0.10. 
 
One might wonder at this point whether the grant coefficient estimate is in fact inflated by spurious 
correlation between local expenditure and grants due to omitted variables driving both. However, a 
grant coefficient estimate of around 1 in the fully constrained sample is hardly surprising. Given that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
income elasticities equal 0.8 and 0.1 in the Kn=1 sample, and around 0.6 and 0.5 in the Kn=0 sample. 
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other sources of revenue (including balances) constitute a negligible average share of total provincial 
revenues, equation (6) represents a reasonable approximation to the actual budgeting choice, meaning 
that 1)( ≅∂∂ ∗gz q  if all tax rates are frozen at their (upper or lower) limits. As for the moderately 
constrained sample, an endogeneity bias would most likely play against the point we are making here, 
in the sense of driving up the estimate of 0gβ  and narrowing the gap between the two subsamples. 
 
Table 5 Time-invariant splitting criterion: separate equations 
 (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) 
 Kn = 1 Kn = 0 Kn = 1 Kn = 0 Kn = 1 Kn = 0 
grants 0.975** 
(0.048)  
0.722** 
(0.050)  
0.974** 
(0.048) 
0.716** 
(0.050)  
0.989** 
(0.051)  
0.731** 
(0.053)  
income   0.008 
(0.035)  
0.055* 
(0.026)  
0.015 
(0.037)  
0.042 
(0.032)  
population     -0.048 
(0.099)  
-0.142 
(0.133)  
age 0-4 share     9.770 
(8.986)  
-5.750 
(8.115)  
age 65+ share     3.991 
(4.439)  
-6.076 
(5.593)  
election     0.583 
(1.921)  
-0.315 
(1.913)  
right-wing     1.090 
(3.003)  
6.767 
(7.143)  
Observations 144 120 144 120 144 120 
Authorities 24 20 24 20 24 20 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: real current spending per capita. Fixed Province and year effects included. Kn defined in 
equation (15). Standard errors in parentheses. **: p-value < 0.01; *: p-value < 0.10. 
 
5.3 Endogenous time-varying selection 
In order to implement the Wooldridge (1995) procedure and allow for endogenous selection into the 
Knt=1 regime and fixed Province effects, we now need to focus on the authorities that are observed to 
be switching between regimes over time. This allows us to proceed as discussed in section 4, and 
estimate the Probit selection equation (25) in the first stage, with Knt as defined in equation (16). 
After excluding Provinces that are consistently constrained or unconstrained over the entire time 
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period, as well as those observed in the fully constrained Knt=1 regime for less than two years, we end 
up with a balanced panel of 43 switching Provinces over the eight years 2000-2007. Importantly, since 
we aim at estimating the response of authority n’s spending to grants in year t provided that authority n 
stays on the same portion of its budget constraint, we require the fully constrained tax mix of authority 
n in year t to be identical as in year t-1 in order for that observation to be selected into the Knt=1 regime 
(Bond and Meghir, 1994). 
 
Table 6 Time-varying splitting criterion: switching Provinces 
 (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) 
 Knt = 1 Knt = 0 Knt = 1 Knt = 0 Knt = 1 Knt = 0 
grants  0.986** 
(0.023) 
0.792** 
(0.056) 
0.986** 
(0.023) 
0.785** 
(0.056 
0.979** 
(0.025) 
0.793** 
(0.057) 
income   0.004 
(0.025) 
0.042 
(0.033) 
0.001 
(0.026) 
0.047 
(0.050) 
population     0.044 
(0.053) 
0.026 
(0.056) 
age 0-4 share     -0.397 
(5.353) 
-15.957* 
(8.896) 
age 65+ share     0.255 
(2.405) 
-2.318 
(3.810) 
election     1.126 
(1.353) 
0.160 
(2.527) 
right-wing     0.993 
(2.461) 
7.239 
(5.747) 
Observations 230 114 230 114 230 114 
Authorities 43 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: real current spending per capita. Fixed Province and year effects included. Knt defined in 
equation (16). Standard errors in parentheses. **: p-value < 0.01; *: p-value < 0.10. 
 
Table 6 reports the benchmark fixed effects estimation results of the switching regression model (16)-
(17)-(18) under assumption (19) of exogenous selection into the fully capped regime. It is remarkable 
that local authorities’ expenditures exhibit the expected excess sensitivity when fully constrained 
( )11 ≅gβ , while the sensitivity of spending to grants is significantly lower ( )8.00 <gβ  and the sensitivity 
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to income is higher ( )010 ≅> ii ββ  when the same authorities are only moderately constrained. 
 
Table 7 Wooldridge two-stage approach (Knt = 1) 
 
 (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) 
 First stage (Knt) Second stage (znt) 
 Probit (balanced) Wooldridge correction 
 qnt qn qnt qn 
grants  -0.003 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.969** 
(0.045) 
-0.039 
(0.050) 
income  -0.002 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.044) 
0.015 
(0.047) 
population -0.010 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.090 
(0.099) 
-0.089 
(0.100) 
age 0-4 share -4.086** 
(0.816) 
4.168** 
(0.872) 
6.408 
(22.653) 
-3.221 
(21.597) 
age 65+ share -0.916* 
(0.389) 
0.921* 
(0.395) 
2.707 
(6.127) 
-0.363 
(5.925) 
election 0.292 
(0.267) 
-1.533 
(1.619) 
3.137 
(2.832) 
-14.817 
(11.938) 
right-wing -0.626 
(0.525) 
0.317 
(0.594) 
-1.431 
(5.519) 
-0.677 
(5.069) 
λn2000   -11.337 
(10.410) 
λn2001   -5.202 
(12.476) 
λn2002   6.908 
(13.097) 
λn2003   19.600 
(21.033) 
λn2004   24.571 
(20.813) 
λn2005   -16.283 
(16.846) 
λn2006   -6.494 
(14.890) 
λn2007   -3.103 
(9.673) 
Observations 344 230 
Authorities 43 
Wald test ρ=0 
(p value) 
  0.99 
(0.44) 
Wooldridge test λnt 
(p value) 
  -0.631 
(0.95) 
 
Notes: Year effects included in all columns. Column (7.3): deviations from group means. Knt defined in equation (16). 
Standard errors in parentheses. **: p-value < 0.01; *: p-value < 0.10. 
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Table 7 reports the two-stage estimation results allowing for endogenous selection and fixed authority 
effects both in the selection equation and in the main equation. 
Probit estimation of the first-stage binary selection equation (16) - columns (7.1)-(7.2) - reveals that 
grants have no systematic impact on selection into the Knt=1 regime. This is to be expected due to the 
constrained regime heterogeneity including high spending authorities hitting the upper tax bounds and 
low spending authorities hitting the lower tax bounds: in fact, almost 40% of the observations in the 
selected Knt=1 sample hit at least one lower tax limit, making it difficult to predict the impact of the 
variables in the ntq  vector on the reduced form selection index. 
As far as the stochastic component of equation (16) is concerned, the second stage estimation results 
suggest that the selection process can be considered exogenous with respect to the local public 
spending pattern described by equation (17): the Wooldridge (1995) variable addition test reported at 
the bottom of table 7 is far from statistical significance.26 
Finally, columns (7.3)-(7.4) reveal that performing the Wooldridge (1995) correction discussed in 
section 4 - equation (29) - has a negligible impact on the estimation results, including in particular the 
excess sensitivity of local public spending to grants. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
By explicitly recognizing and incorporating the left and right corners that are typically produced by 
state-wide limitations on local tax rates, this paper has modelled the local tax mix determination 
process and shown how excess sensitivity of local public spending to grants arises in the endogenously 
generated constrained tax mix. 
                                                            
26The test relies on fixed effects estimation of the spending equation for the unbalanced panel of Knt=1, after adding the 
inverse Mills' ratio from the first stage Probit estimation on the balanced panel. The null hypothesis of the test is: 
0),,( 11 =nnnntE vqζη  against the alternative: ntnnnnt vE ρζη =),,( 11 vq , while no hypothesis is made on how 1nζ  
depends on nn vq ,  (Wooldridge, 1995). 
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In particular, the paper has shown that the effect of private income on public spending should be 
expected to be tiny or nil in the presence of binding limitations on all local tax revenue sources, while 
grants should be predicted to have a large - actually, a one-for-one - impact on local expenditures. 
Interestingly, the above result holds when either upper or lower tax limitations are in place, and the 
analysis shows that a binding limitation on just one of the available own revenue sources is enough to 
generate some form of flypaper effect, in the sense of an excess sensitivity of local spending to grants. 
In fact, since excess sensitivity of local public spending should be predicted to arise and generally tends 
to manifest itself both when grants increase and when they decrease, the flypaper effect label seems an 
inappropriate or even misleading one. 
By using panel data on the Italian Provinces over the years 2000s, the paper has exploited the clustering 
of provincial authorities at the corners generated by central government lower and upper tax limitation 
rules to estimate the sensitivity of local public expenditures to grants. The empirical evidence arising 
from a switching regression approach that allows for fixed effects and endogenous selection into the 
constrained sample consistently suggests that the response of local spending to grants is significantly 
higher for fully constrained authorities than for authorities that can manoeuvre at least one tax 
instrument. While not dismissing the role of alternative explanations of local public spending excess 
sensitivity, it seems that the intensity of tax and expenditure limitations ought not to be ignored when 
investigating the local tax mix determination process and the kinky reaction of local authorities to 
central government grant policy. 
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 Appendix: Data description 
 
Table A1 Variables used in the analysis: descriptive statistics 
 obs. mean s.d. min max 
Vehicle registration surtax rate (%) 720 17.7 7.2 0 30 
Electricity consumption tax rate (€ cents per kW) 720 10.4 1.0 9.3 11.4 
Waste management surtax rate (%) 720 4.5 1.1 1 5 
Electricity (domestic consumption per capita, kW) 720 1089.7 113.3 771.5 1484.2
Population (,000) 720 567.9 631.6 89.0 4061.5
Aged 0-4 share 720 4.4 0.6 3.0 6.3 
Aged 65+ share 720 20.4 3.1 12.0 27.5 
Real current spending per capita (€) 720 146.1 46.1 56.9 291.9 
Real grants per capita (€) 720 118.2 44.7 36.6 249.0 
Election year (%) 720 15.4    
Right-wing control (%) 720 33.6    
 
Table A2 Variables used in the analysis: data sources 
 Data source 
Vehicle registration tax rate Automobile Club Italy - Quattroruote  
Electricity consumption tax rate Italian Government, Ministry of Finance 
Electricity (domestic consumption) Terna Rete Elettrica Nazionale - S.p.A. 
Waste management tax rate Italian Government, Home Office 
Current spending Italian Government, Home Office 
Grants Italian Government, Home Office 
Election year Italian Government, Home Office 
Right-wing control Italian Government, Home Office 
Population & demographics National Statistics Institute 
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